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the weekly money stock on common stock prices. Survey data on money market
participants' forecasts of money changes are employed to construct the
measure of unanticipated movements in the money stock. The results indicate
that an unexpected increase in money depresses stock prices and, consistent
with the efficient markets hypothesis, only the unexpected part of the weekly
money announcement causes stock price fluctuations. The October 1979 change
in Federal Reserve operating procedures appears to have made stock prices
somewhat more sensitive to large money surprises.
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TO UNANTICIPATED CHANGES IN MONEY
Much of the past work on the money—stock market relationship centered
on the question of whether money is a leading indicator of stock prices.
Studies by Sprinkel [23], Homa and Jaffee [11], and Hamburger and Kochin [9]
supported the view that past increases in money lead to increases in equity
prices.Theimplicationof this work was that investors could earn above
normal profits by using a trading strategy based on the observed behavior
of the money stock. This contradicts the efficient markets hypothesis which
assertsthat current asset prices reflect all available information so that
no such trading strategy can exist. Subsequent research by Cooper [31,
Pesando [18], Rozeff [22], and Rogalski and Vinso [20] has shown that past
money changes do not contain predictive information on stock prices, upholding
the efficient markets view.
This paper investigates whether the response of common stock prices
to weekly money announcements is consistent with the prediction of the
efficient markets hypothesis. Unlike the above research, therefore, the
focus is on the very short—run response of stock prices to both anticipated
and unanticipated announced changes in money. Recent work by Berkman [1],
Grossman [8], Urich and Wachtel 1261, and Roley [21] indicates that short—
term interest rates respond only to the unexpected component of the announce-
ment, with short—term rates rising when the announced change in money exceeds
1/ . theexpected change.— Berkman also examined the reaction of stock prices,
finding that an unanticipated increase in the money supply depressed share
prices. Lynge [13] found that positive money announcements lowered stock—2—
prices, but since he did not distinguish expected from unexpected money
growth,his results do not bear directly on the efficient markets issue.
In investigating the response of stock prices to weekly money announce-
ments, survey data on market participants' forecasts of the announced
weekly change are used to distinguish expected from actual changes in money.
Using these data, the usual representation of the efficient markets model
is generalized by allowing the possibility that responses to unanticipated
money are both nonlinear and asymmetric. Three further questions are then
considered: has the reaction of stock prices changed since the Federal
Reserve altered its monetary control procedures in October 1979; does the
impact of unexpected money on stock prices extend beyond the opening quotes;
and do stock prices move in anticipation of the money announcement.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, the theo-
retical framework linking money and stock prices is reviewed. The data on
money announcements, the survey measure of expected money changes, and changes
in stock prices are described in the second section. In the third and fourth
sections, the empirical results are presented, while the final section
summarizes the main conclusions.—3—
I. Theoretical Framework
At least two explanations are consistent with the notion that stock
prices are negatively related to unanticipated announced weekly changes in
money. One explanation is that when money rises faster than expected, agents
revise upward their expectations of future inflation. In turn, higher
expected inflation is thought to depress stock prices through a number of
channels. Feldstein [6] argues that inflation decreases real after—tax
profits because of the nonindexation of inventory and depreciation charges.
Lower expected profits require equity prices to drop in order for stock to
provide a competitive return. Empirical support for this view is reported
by Summers [25] in an analysis of firm data. Increased expected inflation
would also depress stock prices if it raises the expected return on an
alternative asset such as owner—occupied housing. Hendershott and Hu [101
and Summers [24] provide evidence that this effect was significant in the
1970g. Finally, higher anticipated inflation would cause stock prices to
fall if, as Modigliani and Cohn 115] contend, investors mistakenly compare
the nominal return on bonds, swelled by inflation, to the earnings—price
ratios of stocks (a real rate of return).--"
An alternative interpretation is that the response of stock prices to
unexpected money reflects agents' expectations of the reaction of the Federal
Reserve to the surprise. In particular, market participants may believe
that the Federal Reserve will move rapidly to offset a surge in money with
the consequence of higher short—term interest rates. Moreover, with lagged
reserve accounting, short—term rates may rise even in the absence of overt
Federal Reserve actions if market participants increase their assessment of-.4—
the excess demand for reserves in the current statement week.-' Through
either of these channels, the anticipation of higher rates in the very near
future prompts sales of short—term securities immediately after the announce-
ment, forcing rates to rise. Since the stock market closes before the
announcement but the money market resumes trading after the announcement,
stock market participants will have already observed the rise in short—term
rates associated with the money surprise when planning their activity for
the next business day. If some holders of stock view short—term securities
as substitutes in their portfolios, the higher short—term yields will cause
these agents to place sell orders, and opening stock prices will likely fall
below the closing prices of the day before. Since this theory hinges on
market participants guessing the future actions of the Federal Reserve,
asymmetries in response or changes in response due to different Federal
Reserve operating procedures would not be unlikely.
As a first step in investigating the reaction of stock prices to
announced weekly changes in money, the usual linear model is employed.
This model may be represented as
SP =a÷b(M—iM)+ e (1)
where LSP =changein stock prices observed after the money
announcement
=announcedchange in the money stock
=expectedchange in the money stock
et =randomerror term.
The basic proposition of the efficient markets theory is that only the—5—
unexpected change in money should influence stock prices so that the data
should not reject the restriction that the coefficients on and sum
to zero. The hypothesized behavior of security market participants outlined
above further stipulates that b should be negative.—6—
II.The Data
The weekly data used in this paper begin on September 29, 1977,
and end on January 29, 1982. Specific details about the data on announced
changes in money, expected money, and stock prices follow.
A. Changes in the Money Stock
The money stock data consist of announced weekly changes in the
narrowly defined money stock, in billions of dollars, as reported in the
Federal Reserve's H.6 release. Both a revised estimate of the previous
week's announced level and the change in money for the statement week ending
on Wednesday of the previous calendar week are reported. Until January 31,
1980, the data used here correspond to announced changes in "old Ml" on
Thursdays at 4:10 p.m. Since then, the announcements have been made on
Fridays at 4:10 p.m. For this period, the data employed are those for Ml—B,
and more recently, Ml, where the definition of this latter aggregate is
equivalent to that of M1—B.-" Over the entire sample period, money announce-
ments were made after the stock market closed.
B. Expected Changes in the Money Stock
Themeasure of the expected change in the money stock is the median
forecast of about60 moneymarket participants who are surveyed each week
byMoney Market Services, Inc.' When the money announcement was made on
Thursdays, this firm solicited forecasts of the change in Ml on both Tuesdays
and Thursdays. The Thursday median prediction is used hereas the measure
ofthe expected change during this period. Since February 8, 1980 (when the
Federal Reserve switched to Friday announcements), the survey has been
conducted only on Tuesdays, and the aggregate predicted until the beginning—7—
of 1982 was Mi—B, and since then, Ml. The median of these anticipated
changes is used as the measure of the market's expected change for this
6/
period.—
Based on the results of other studies, the survey expectations
measure appears to be rational. Grossman [8] examined the survey data
for the pre—October 1979 period, and found that they were efficient and
outperformed a simple autoregressive model in predicting weekly money
7/
changes.—For the post—October 1979 period, Roley [21] found that the
null hypotheses of unbiasedness and efficiency could not be rejected at
the 5 percent level of significance, and that the survey data again outper-
formed an autoregressive forecasting equation.
C. Stock Prices
Since the efficient markets theory asserts that current stock prices
reflect all available information, the change in stock prices should be from
just before the announcement to the first observation of prices after the
announcement. For stock prices, this amounts to subtracting the closing
prices on the day of the announcement from the opening prices on the first
businessday following the announcement. Since market participants have
overnight (or over the weekend for the latter part of the sample) to plan
theirresponse to the new information in the announcement, their reactions
should be reflected in the buy and sell orders given to the specialists for
each stock before the market opens. Hence, the specialists' opening prices,
which attempt to balance supply and demand for each stock, should embody
all the effects of the money surprises.' The possibility that the effect
of unanticipated money persists is, however, explored in section IV. The—8--
particular stock index employed is the Dow Jones Industrial Average
(DJIA).2-" Thus, the dependent variable is the Fridayopening value of
the DJLk less its Thursday close for the period up to January 31, 1980,
and the Monday opening less the Friday close for the remainder of the
sample period)21—9—
III. Estimation Results
In this section, the effects of anticipated and unanticipated announced
changes in money are examined using the basic linear model of equation (1).
The robustness of the results from this model is then checked by testing for
reactions to announced revisions of the money stock and for nonlinear responses.
All models are estimated and tested over three subsamples. The first
period begins on September 29, 1977, when the money survey was initiated,
and ends on October 4, 1979, two days before the Federal Reserve announced
the switch in its operating procedures. Period two covers the weeks after
the policy change when the money announcement was still made on Thursdays.
Period three starts on February 7, 1980, when the money announcement was
shifted to Friday, and runs to January 29, 1982. Observations were dropped
if the money announcement was not made on the usual day or if a holiday inter-
vened between the announcement day and the next business day)-"
A. Basic Model
Table I presents the estimates of the simple linear—response model (1)
for each of the subsamples. Dummy variables were added to the model to allow
for the possible effects of changes in the Federal Reserve's discount rate
announced after the stock market closed)-' The reported F—statistics test
the hypothesis that the coefficients on and iM sum to zero so that only
unanticipated changes in money affect stock prices. As these test statistics
indicate, this implication of the efficient markets hypothesis cannot be
rejected at conventional significance levels.
The results from Table I also support the theories, given in section I,
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































onstock prices. In particular, an unanticipated increase in money of $1
billion is associated with a subsequent fall in the DJIA of about .7 points.
Moreover, the coefficients on unanticipated money are statistically less
than zero at the 1 percent level except for the middle period which has
only 14 observations.
B. More Generalized Models
The model used above imposes several implicit constraints which, if not
appropriate, might bias the estimated effects of anticipated and unanticipated
money. This section relaxes two such constraints and reestimates the effects.
One constraint involves the reaction of stock prices to revisions in
the previous week's announced level of the money stock. The basic model (1)
assumes that stock prices react only to unanticipated changes in money,
although new information about the level is also announced. If this infor-
mation also affects stock prices the model becomes
=a.+ b(itM—iM) + c(M1—M1) + d7D. + e (2)
where Mr=revisedestimate of N announced at time t t—l t—l
Ma1 =levelof the money stock announced at time t—l
=dummyvariable associated with a change in the
discount rate at time t.
Furthermore,an equal response to both the unexpected change and the announced
revision, i.e., b =c,means that agents respond to the errors in predicting
the current level of money stock and not just to the unanticipated changes
in money. In this case the model becomes"—11—
SP =a+ b(Na_Me) + d.D. + e (3)
t t tlit t
where M =predictedlevel of the money stock at time t.
When equation (2) is estimated, the hypothesis that b =cis never rejected
14 /
bythe data implying that equation (3) is preferred.—
The response to anticipated money is therefore reexamined by estimating
equation (3) and testing the constraint that the coefficients onand M
sum to zero. Panel A of Table II presents these results. The reported F—
statistics are for the hypothesis that only a surprise in the level of money
matters—as opposed to the expected level—and this hypothesis cannot be
rejected at high significance levels. Thus, this specification also supports
the efficient markets hypothesis.
The other constraint which is considered is that the response of stock
prices is linear. This restriction can be relaxed by specifying a quadratic
functional form




Equation(4) allows both the unexpected and expected money levels to affect
stock prices nonlinearly. If only the unanticipated level matters, the
coefficients on M, c1 and c2, should be jointly equal to zero.
Panel B of Table II presents the estimates of equation C4)foreach
subsample, with the restriction imposed that c1 and c2 are zero. The reported
F—statistics indicate that this hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5 percent
significance level. The estimated model for the first period strongly supports



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































diminishes for larger surprises. For the third period, the nonlinear term
is smaller and is only significant at the 10 percent level.'—13—
IV.AFurther Examination of the Stock Price Response
Three aspects of the response of stock prices of money surprises are
considered in this section. First, the evidence concerning any change in
the response as a result of the Federal Reserve's adoption of a reserve—
aggregate monetary control procedure is reviewed. Second, the question of
whether the stock price response is complete within one day is examined.
Finally, the behavior of stock prices prior to the weekly money announcement
is investigated.
A. Did the Response Change in the Post—October 1979 Period?
As a result of the Federal Reserve's adoption of new monetary control
procedures in October 1979, Roley 1211 finds that 3—month Treasury bill
yields have become much more responsive. Thus, if stocks and money market
instruments are close substitutes, stock prices may be more responsive
as a result. HOwever, if investors are more concerned about the inflation
consequences of an unanticipated change in money, the reaction of stock
prices may be the same, or even less, than before. In particular, if the
new procedures correspond to a greater commitment by the Federal Reserve
to reduce inflation, any given surprise may contain less information about
future inflation since it may be offset in the near future. Thus, it is
not possible, a priori, to predict whether the reaction of stock prices
should increase in the post—October 1979 period.
The equality of stock price responses in the pre— and post—October
1979 periods was tested for both the basic model (1) and the nonlinear model.
In the case of the basic model, the hypothesis that the response was the
same in the one pre—October 1979 period and the two post—October 1979 periods—14—
cannot be rejected even at the 50 percent significance level)1 For the
nonlinear specification, however, this hypothesis is rejected at the 10
percent level, and the hypothesis that the response in the first andthird
periods is the same is rejected at the 5 percent level.--' As isapparent
in panel B of Table II, stock prices appear to have reacted lesssharply to
small surprises and more sharply to large surprises after the Federal Reserve
began employing the reserve—aggregate approach to monetarycontrol.
To further investigate the effect of monetary policy,money surprises
were disaggregated according to the relation of money growth to the Federal
Reserve's long—run ranges)1' Following Urich and Wachtel [26],surprises
were divided into three groups: positive surprises whenmoney was above its
target range, negative surprises when money was below the range, and all other
surprises. Both the basic model (1) and the nonlinear model were estimated
with these additional terms. In each case, the results indicatedthat the
coefficients on the disaggregated surprises are notsignificantly different..121
Since Urich and Wachtel [26) and Roley [21] foundsignificantly different
Treasury bill yield responses when money was outside Federal Reserve policy
ranges,the lack of such differences for stock pricesappears to provide some
support for the expected inflation channel. Nevertheless,the tests across
periodsusing the nonlinear model did suggest that the response differed in
the pre— and post—October1979 periods.Thus, itappearsthat no clear choice
between the policy expectations and expected inflationchannelscan be made.
B.IstheStock Price Response Complete Within One Day?
Inorderto investigate whether the effect of unanticipatedmoney on
stockpricespersists beyond the openingpricesof the day after the—15—
announcement, the linear and nonlinear models were reestimated using two
alternative dependent variables. The first, iSPl, is the change in the
DJIA from the opening quotes to 11:00 a.m. EST, one hour after the market
opens. The second, SP2, is the change in the DJIA from the opening to the
close for the day after the announcement.
Panel A of Table III presents the estimated nonlinear models for each
subsample. As these results indicate, the only evidence of persistence
occurs in the third period when the dependent variable is SPl, and the
estimated response is substantially smaller than the initial reaction (compare
equation 3.5 with equation 2.6).---" Thus, these results generally support
the view that the response of stock prices to money surprises is immediate.
C. Do Stock Prices Move in Anticipation of Money Announcements?
The final area examined here concerns the movement of stock prices to
money announcements. If the stock market is efficient, and if investors view
money announcements as a source of significant information, then stock prices
may respond to any new information related to the forthcoming announcement.'
To investigate this aspect of stock price behavior, it is assumed that
equilibrium stock prices at the close of day i may be represented as
Spi =.E(Ma1)+ (5)
where SP. =closingstock prices on day i
Na =announcedlevel of the money stock on Friday
at 4:10 p.m.
X =lxkvector of variables
=informationset used by investors on day iTable III
FURTHERPROPERTIESOF THE STOCK PRICE RESPONSE
A. Stock Price Responses After the Market Opens
ASP a + +e
Estimated Coefficients SummaryStatistics
Time Period Dependent a b b SER DW(i)
________________________ Variable ________ 1 2 _______ ________
3.1September 29, 1977 ASP1 .624 .327 —.086 —.008 1.948 2.02(5)
—October 4, 1979 (3.171) (.984) (—.722)
n 102
3.2 ASP2 .941 —.462 .050 —.017 8.860 1.76(5)
(1.056) (—.311) (.093)
3.3 October 11, 1979— A5p1 —.727 1.503 —.566 —.106 3.842 1.35(3)
January 31, 1980 (—.670) (.846) (—.863)
n 14
3.4 ASP2 —1.102 1.589 —1.794 .147 10.945 .65(3)
(—.357) (.314) (—.960)
3.5 February 8, 1980 ASP1 —.918 —.565 .042 .132 2.386 1.39(13)
—January 29, 1982 (—3.532) (—2.557) (.932) n88
3.6 ASP2 —.637 —.346 .026 —.019 9.116 1.43(13)
(—.642) (—.410) (.148)






a b c SER DW(i)
3.7February 8, 1980 Ma —Me 1.723 —.006 .280 .054 2.414 1.9l(1])
—January 29, 1982 (2.604) (—.330) (2.544)
n =88
Definitions:
ASPi =DJIAat 11:00 minus its opening value on the day after the money announcement
ASP2closing DJIA minus its opening value on the day after the money announcement
=Fridayclosing DJIA
SPT,t =Tuesdayclosing DJIA
RF,t =3—monthTreasury bill yield, Friday at 3:30p.m.EST (Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
"QuoteSheet of Closing Rates")
=3—monthTreasury bill yield, Tuesday at 3:30p.m.EST (Source: ibid.)—16—
E(... JL)= expectationconditional on 2.
=scalarand kxl vector of coefficients.
Thus, the effect of new information on equilibrium stock prices from
Tuesday—the day of the money survey in the third period—to just before




which is represented by the market
survey measure.
Also, if expectations are rational, then
Ma =E(MalF)+ CF (7)
where CF =randomerror uncorrelated with any information in
A consistent estimate of the effect of new information concerning the money
announcement on stock prices may therefore be obtained by combining equations





To implement this specification empirically, the additional assumption is
made that changes in the expectations of other relevant variables may be
represented solely by the change in the 3—month Treasury bill yield from
Tuesday to Friday; i.e.,
Ma— Ma = a+ b•(SPF—SPT) + c*(RF_RT) + eF (8)
where RT,Rp =3—monthTreasury bill yield at 3:30 p.m.—17—
on Tuesday and Friday, respectively,
andthecoefficient definitions follow from (8).
The estimation results for equation (8) are reported in panel B of
Table III. The results indicate that the movement in stock prices prior
to the announcement is not significantly related to the unexpected part of
the money announcement, unlike the movement in interest rates. This result
could follow either if stock prices do not reflect new information concerning
the announced level of money which became available during the week or if
stock prices move in response to new information about a variety of other
relevant factors, thereby causing a low correlation between money surprises
and stock prices.—18—
IV. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has examined the short—run reaction of stock prices to
weeklymoney announcements. The results of this analysis can be summarized
as follows: (1) stock prices respond only to the unexpected change in the
money stock as predicted by the efficient markets theory; (2) an unexpected
increase in money depresses stock prices; (3) stock market participants take
into account the revisions in the level of the money stock as well as
unexpected changes; (4) the stock price response is symmetric with respect
to the sign of the money surprise and does not depend on the relationship
of money to the long—runtarget ranges of the Federal Reserve; (.5)thestock
priceresponse appears to be nonlinear and has changed since the Federal
Reserveswitched to a reserve—aggregate approach to monetary control in
October 1979; and (6) the stock price response is essentially complete early
in the subsequent trading day.
The absence of any asymmetrical or policy range effects contrasts
with the results of studies on the interest rate response to money surprises.
While these effects were not evident, the results nevertheless indicate
that the October 1979 change in policy regimes has affected the response
of stock prices to money surprises. In particular, large money surprises
since October 1979 have been associated with larger changes in stock prices.Ref e ren ce s
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1. Using the same survey data as those used here, Urich and Wachtel [23]
obtain this result in tests over individual years, but not over the entire
period corresponding to the availability of the survey data. Using a different
time interval to measure changes in short—term interest rates, Grossman [8]
and Roley [21] find that anticipated announced changes in money as represented
by the survey data are not statistically significant over the same sample
period.
2. A number of empirical studies have found a negative relationship between
inflation and stock prices, including those by Bodie [2J, Jaf fee and Mandelker
fl2], Nelson [17], and Faina and Schwert {5J. The results in these studies are
in sharp contrast to the traditional view that stock prices are either unaffected
by or perhaps positively related to expected inflation. See, for example,
Williams [27].
3. See Grossman [8] and Roley [21] for more detailed descriptions of these
arguments.4. Announcedchanges in Mi—B are analyzed here because oftheemphasis
placed onMi—B by the Federal Reserve policymakers and market participants.
Itshould also be noted that the Mi—B data for 1981 are not the shift—
adjustedMi—B figures which reflect the introduction of nationwide NOW
accounts. While the Federal Reserve's target range was in terms of shif t
adjusted Mi—B, weekly announced changes were not shift adjusted.
5. We are grateful to Mr. Raul A. Nicho of Money Market Services, Inc.,
for supplying the survey data.
6. An alternative measure was also used for this latter era which adjusted
the Tuesday forecast to take account of relevant information which became
available between Tuesday and the Friday announcement. Following Roley [21],
this new information was assumed to be reflected by the change in the 3—month
Treasury bill yield from 3:30 p.m. on Tuesday to 3:30 p.m. on Friday. To
capture this new information, the announced money change was regressed on
the median predicted change and the change in the Treasury bill yield. The
fitted values from this regression formed the "revised" expectations of
weekly changes in money. However, despite the difference between estimation
results using the survey and revised expectations measures for the Treasury
bill market found by Roley [21], the two expectations measures yielded
virtually the same results for the stock market. Thus, only empirical results
using the survey measure are reported in what follows. For a further dis-
cussion of the rationale for using a revised expectations measure, see the
related discussion in section IV.C.
7. The basic notion behind the efficiency test is that if weekly changes
in money are generated by an autoregressive process, the market's expectationshould be generated by the same process. See, for example, Modigliani and
Shiller [15] and Pesando [181. While Grossman [8] could not reject efficiency,
unbiasedness could be rejected. However, the rejection resulted from a
statistically significant constant term. This measure could therefore be
adjusted by adding the estimated bias to the survey measure. However, the
response of stock prices estimated in this paper would be unaffected since
a constant term is always included in the specifications.
8.For evidence that opening prices are as representative of equilibrium
prices as subsequent intra—day transactions prices, see Garbade and Sekaran [7].
9. The DJIA was used because opening prices of broader stock price indices,
such as the Standard and Poor's 500, are not publicly available. Since
opening prices are calculated by specialists in each stock, the use of the
DJIA may also be preferable given the large trading volumes of the stocks
included in this index.
10. We are grateful to Morgan Lynge, Jr., for the DJIA data through 1979.
The observations for 1980—82 are from Barron's.
11. Four observations were dropped in the first time period, three in the
second, and 13 in the third.
12. The discount rate dummy variables are defined as follows:
D1 =1when discount rate raised 1/4 point
=0otherwise
D2
=1when discount rate raised 1/2 point
=0otherwise
D3 =1when surcharge raised 3 points
=0otherwiseD4 =1when discount rate lowered 1 point
=0otherwise
D5
=1when surcharge lowered 1 point
=0otherwise
D6 =1when discount rate lowered 1 point and surcharge lowered 1 point
=0otherwise.
The estimated coefficients on changes in the discount rate—in cases where
they are statistically significant—imply that an increase in the discount
rate depresses stock prices, and vice versa. For example, the lowering of
both the discount rate and the surcharge by 1 percentage point on October 30,
1981, is estimated to have raised the DJIA by over 11 points.
13. The equivalence of equation (2) andequation(3), under the assumption
that b =cS',can be seen by noting that
= —
and,under the assumption that agents expect no revision in the previous
week's announced level,
=Me—M1.
14. The relevant F—statistics for the three periods are F (1,97) =.97,
F (1,11) =.17,and F (1,81) =.39,with marginal significance levels of
.325, .686, and .544, respectively.
15. Note that in each period the nonlinear term reduces the magnitude of
the response per dollar of money surprise as the surprise becomes larger.
This behavior is consistent with the notion that, due to seasonal or otherfactors, large surprises are sometimes offset in subsequent weeks.
16. The F—statistic is equal to 0.643 with (2,192) degrees of freedom. As
is the case for all tests across the three subsamples reported in this paper,
the estimated equation for the pooled sample was corrected for heteroscedas—
ticity by weighting the observations in each subperiod by the reciprocal
of the estimated standard error from the subperiod regression.
17. The F—statistic for the hypothesis that both linear and nonlinear
coefficients are constant over time is 2.048 with (4,189) degrees of freedom,
which has a marginal significance level of 0.088. The F—statistic for the
hypothesis that the first and third periods had the same coefficients is
3.758 with (2,189) degrees of freedom, which has a marginal significance
level of 0.025.
18. While Urich and Wachtel [26J employ short—run ranges, the Federal
Reserve's long—run ranges are used here. Long—run ranges are used for two
reasons. First, market participants probably made more accurate assessments
ofthe long—run ranges. Second, the short—run ranges (and later, paths)
were, in principle, set to be consistent with eventually obtaining money
growthwithin the long—run ranges.
19.For the linear model (1), the relevant F—statistics for the three sub—
samplesare .878 (2,96), .583 (1,11), and 2.506 (2,80) with marginal significance
levels of .422, .461, and .086, respectively. For the nonlinear model, the
relevant F—statistics were .815 (4,93) and 1.047 (4,77) for the first and
third periods with marginal significance levels of .521 and .389, respectively.
The second period was too short for a meaningful test.
20. The linear model yielded identical conclusions. As in the nonlinear case,the only significant response occurred in the third period for the LxSP1
measure. The point estimate in this case was —.345with a t—statistic of
—3.714. This response is roughly half of the initial response and, again,
disappears over the entire trading day.
21. Because only the data for the third subsample is particularly well
suited to investigate this aspect of stock price behavior, the other two
subsamples will not be considered further. In particular, the time interval
between the market survey and the money announcement must be of sufficient
length to allow two stock price observations. Since the exact time of
the day that the market survey is taken is somewhat uncertain, the Thursday
survey and announcement data used here for the first two periods do not
lend themselves to this analysis.
22. Note that the methodology employed here is similar to that used, for
example, by Fama [4] and Mishkin [14] in investigating real interest rates.
23. There are at least two possible rationales for including the observed
change in the Treasury bill yield in equation (.8). First, since a Treasury
bill is an alternative asset, the expected bill yield may be relevant in the
determination of stock prices. If this is the case, and if the bill yield
follows a random walk, then the observed change in the bill yield represents
the relevant change in the expected bill yield. Second, following Fama [4],
the change in the bill yield may represent a change in expected inflation.